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Abstract
In response to Stephen Neale (2016), I argue that aphonic expressions, such as
PRO, are intentionally uttered by normal speakers of natural language, either by
acts of omitting to say something explicitly, or by acts of giving phonetic real-
ization to aphonics. I argue, also, that Gricean intention-based semantics should
seek divorce from Cartesian assumptions of transparent access to propositional
attitudes and, consequently, that Stephen Schier’s so-called meaning-intention
problem is not powerful enough to banish alleged cases of over-intellectualization
in contemporary philosophy of language and mind.
1 Introduction
Many linguists and philosophers of language believe there are linguistic expressions
which are phonetically unrealized. Such expressions are syntactically real but lacking
in phonetic and phonological properties. One of the most theoretically entrenched
examples is (big) PRO which, according to current linguistics, occurs silently in sen-
tences like
(1) [S[NP Wanda1][VP wants PRO1 to win]]
and is anaphoric on its head NP. Clearly, the postulation of a silent expression like
PRO raises all sorts of fascinating questions, some of which have been of particular
interest to philosophers.
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Stephen Neale, in ‘Silent Reference’ (2016), does an excellent job of bringing the
questions and issues involved to the fore.1 He is particularly concerned, as I see it, with
showing that philosophers ought to be more careful and discerning in their use of this
instrument in theorizing. Surely, his advice should be taken to heart. Philosophers
need to consider when it is appropriate and plausible to posit phonetically unrealized
expressions or syntax and when it is not. It may, for example, be all too tempting
for, say, an epistemologist to say that speakers simply refer implicitly to epistemic
standards whenever they use the word ‘know.’ But this raises all sorts of questions.
How do they do so? Are they aware of doing it? And are they aware of doing it in the
way the theory says they are?
However, in this paper, I argue that Neale’s basic metaphysics is too restrictive to
do justice to the theoretical options open to philosophers. He assumes, specically,
that it would be absurd to entertain the possibility of uttering phonetically null expres-
sions. He also denes the class of aphonics of interest as expressions which, ‘by their
very nature,’ lack phonological properties. I argue that these are mistakes and, further,
that they are inconsistent with Neale’s other commitments. And those other commit-
ments are, by the look of it, more important. In the nal section, I argue that Stephen
Schier’s so-called meaning-intention problem and Neale’s related aphonic-intention
problem are considerably less serious than they suggest. Borrowing a page or two
from Peter Carruthers’ (2011) work and from research in dual system psychology, I
show that Schier and Neale make doubtful and controversial assumptions about the
reliability or transparency of speakers’ self-knowledge, making the meaning-intention
problem far less eective in combating the alleged over-intellectualization of other
theorists. Importantly, however, I argue that Gricean intention-based semantics can
easily survive as a Cartesian divorcee, since meaning can still be determined by speak-
ers’ communicative intentions; they just don’t necessarily have conscious awareness
of the contents of those intentions.
2 Mad Hatters, Cheshire Catters, and Troublemak-
ers
According to Neale, there is implicit reference and indirect reference. An object is
referred to indirectly when a proposition which is merely implicated by a speaker
has an object dependent truth condition. Implicit reference, however, occurs when a
speaker expresses an object dependent proposition without there being any particular
linguistic expression with which reference to the object is achieved. So, for example, if
1Page numbers in parentheses refer to Neale’s paper unless indicated otherwise.
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some philosophers are to be believed, and speakers can intend to refer to the location
of the rain by merely uttering
(2) It’s raining
on a given occasion, then implicit reference is indeed ubiquitous in linguistic com-
munication. In very general terms, there are two schools of thought on the nature of
implicit reference: The Mad Hatters and The Cheshire Catters. The Hatters (for short)
believe speakers can refer without there being anything at all with which they refer.
They are as mad as a hatter, speak in riddles, expect their audience simply to work out
what they intend and, just like the Mad Hatter, are punished before committing a crime
rather than after (it’s all in the pragmatics, you see). The Catters don’t speak in riddles
but they see non-existent objects everywhere, such as smiles and aphonic variables.
In particular, they pretend to see these objects even when there is no theoretical need
to do so.
Now, more precisely, the Catters are philosophers who wish to posit aphonic syn-
tactic material in order to explain any plausible case of implicit reference. So, for
example, just like linguists want to introduce the aphonic PRO in (1), Catters might
propose to introduce an aphonic location variable in (2), which could give us (3)
(3) [S[NP It][VP ’s raining[PP/AdvP x]]
as a possible syntactic representation of (2).2 On this model the aphonic variable
could be occurring as an NP within a larger PP (substitutable for ‘in Dublin’) or as an
AdvP (substitutable for ‘here’). In this case, introduction of the variable is motivated,
most obviously, by the claim that a location is necessary for an utterance of (2) to be
evaluable for truth or falsity and, also, by the idea that the variable could be bound by
an explicit quantier, as in ‘Everywhere I go, it’s raining.’ Mad Hatters like Neale and
Schier, however, consider it much more important that ordinary speakers actually
see themselves as having intentions to refer to a location when uttering a sentence
like (2). More about that particular madness later (§4).
It seems like Neale wants in some sense to be both a Hatter and a Catter, so he
takes on the role of Alice in ‘Silent Reference,’ trying to make sense of all the strange
things in Wonderland. He tries to make the debate between Hatters and Catters more
precise and starts by pointing out certain limitations of being a Catter. He points out
2Note, however, that almost everything about (3) is controversial because, for one, expletive ‘it’
is here either a non-argument or quasi-argument. If it is construed as a non-argument – as in con-
structions like ‘It seems that ...’ – the gerundive ‘raining’ in (2) ought to be analyzed as CP with empty
complementizer. It’s also worth noting that many theorists would propose much more complicated
analyses of a sentence like (2), involving multiple hidden variables—for time of utterance, the utterer,
the world, etc.—I focus on the location variable here for simplication (see, e.g., Lewis 1970).
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that aphonic expressions like x in (3) and (unwritten) in (2), will have some rather
strange features. First, they are proper parts of the sentences in which they occur but
they never correspond to any part of any utterance of the sentence. This makes them
very dierent from expressions like ‘cake’ and ‘eejit.’ Secondly, he argues, on this basis,
that there can be no such thing as compositional semantics in which the meanings
of parts of utterances compose to yield meanings for whole utterances, if one of the
parts is supposed to be an utterance of an aphonic expression. A whole utterance
of a sentence is a sequenced event which can be segmented into sub-events where
each sub-event corresponds roughly to a word in the sentence. And, again, if ‘eejit’
is part of the sentence uttered, there will normally a be a roughly demarcated part of
the utterance-event which corresponds to that word. No such utterance-parts will be
found to correspond to PRO or x in (1) and (3). Therefore, compositional semantics
cannot take as inputs the meanings of parts of utterances, if the semantic properties
of aphonics are to play any role in composition. Composition must take as inputs the
semantic properties of something other than utterances of expressions, it would seem;
perhaps the expression-types themselves.
It would seem to follow, then, that one can’t like utterance-based compositional
semantics while being a Catter. But, of course, there are those who appear to do exactly
that and we can call them Mad Catters (Stanley 2007 and Recanati 2010 are possible
examples). After looking around for truthmakers to make Neale’s two claims true, I
realized I could nd nothing but troublemakers. In what follows I discuss two such
troublemakers before, in the next section, turning to more specic arguments against
Neale’s position. We should all be free to be Mad Catters when I’m done.
2.1 Omissions
Neale is rightly concerned with spelling out the nature of and connections between
words, sentences, utterances, propositions and so on. Words are abstract artifacts cre-
ated by linguistic communicative acts and sentences are then, presumably, abstract
structures suitable to contain such artifacts in various syntactic arrangements. On
Neale’s view, utterances of sentences are events. Specically, they are events whereby
sentences are represented or, as he likes to put it, utterances are proxies for sentences.
He makes the important point that the traditional distinction between expression-
types and expression-tokens blurs and confounds these more ne-grained distinctions.
There are not two fundamentally distinct kinds of linguistic expressions, i.e. types
and tokens; there are, rather, expressions and various kinds of proxies for those ex-
pressions. A somewhat similar point has been made before (Searle 1978; Kaplan 1990)
but the distinction still looms large in the literature and Neale makes particularly
clear how detrimental to good theoretical sense it can be. Crudely put, utterances or
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inscriptions of sentences are not sentences any more than a picture of the Queen is
the Queen.
Neale’s discussion of aphonics would have been helped, though, by a more detailed
examination of the kind of event an utterance or inscription is. As he is most certainly
aware, utterances (let’s ignore inscriptions for now) are events under intentional de-
scription as their source is an intentional agent with goals, reasons, desires, beliefs and
various cognitive and circumstantial limitations. In brief, they are intentional actions.
Relatedly, the interpretation of an utterance by a normal hearer is geared towards the
event as an intentional action: why did they choose those words? why are they say-
ing what it seems like they’re saying? Interpretation is geared towards reason-based
explanations of intentional action. Linguistic interpretation—interpretation of speech
acts—is just a special case of attempts at action understanding more generally. We
automatically and eortlessly interpret human actions in terms of beliefs, desires, and
intentions (e.g. Carston 2002: 42-44). Seeing someone walking repeatedly over some
area in a eld, their eyes moving quickly from one part of the grass below to another,
I immediately assume they want to nd something they lost, and that they believe it
is there somewhere.
Already, this is a prima facie troublemaker for Neale’s argument against Mad
Catters. For ease of exposition, let’s use ‘action’ for a complex intentional action and
‘act’ for any proper part of such a complex. What I mean by ‘proper’ part here is
that the part is intentional just as much as the more comprehensive action of which
it is a mere part. So, when I intentionally bake a cake, the act of breaking the eggs
is an intentional proper part of the more comprehensive action. According to some
philosophers, there are actions and acts that have no spatiotemporal properties at all.
These are so-called acts of omission or refraining. Randolph Clarke (2010, 2012a, 2012b,
2014) argues, for example, that some omissions consist in the total absence of action
relative to an agent, time, and location. Omissions can be unintentional or intentional;
the latter he calls refraining. One further condition on refraining to V, for Clarke, is
that there is some norm, standard, or ideal in place to the eect that one should V
(2014: 29). There are others, however, who argue that refraining is always a type of
action (e.g. Brand 1971; Fischer & Ravizza 1998). So, if an MP chooses to refrain from
voting on a bill in parliament some particular bodily movement – or, even, the act of
keeping still exactly then and there – must constitute the act of refraining at that time
and place.
In fact, it doesn’t matter what ontology of omitting or refraining we commit to,
Neale’s argument can only be saved if he can show that Mad Catters are, for some rea-
son, not allowed to appeal to these notions in welding together aphonics and utterance-
based compositional semantics. All parties to the debate agree that there is a sense in
which people can intentionally omit to do something. Kent Bach (2010: 54-56) insists
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that, still, there is no sense in which refraining or omitting can count as actions or acts.
But, as he realizes, omitting is not simply not doing. What counts as an omission, Bach
agrees with Clarke, “is itself partly a normative matter” (Bach 2010: 54). So, whatever
else it is, refraining from acting is part of folk psychology on all fours with acting,
speaking, expressing, and so on. That is to say, even if refraining to act is not really
to act at all or consists in the absence of particular acts or actions, these non-acts can
gure signicantly in speech acts, their planning, and in the interpretation of speech
acts. For our purposes, then, there is no harm in calling omission and refraining acts
or actions. Just bear in mind that they could turn out to consist in the absence of
an action or act on a given occasion – and so, strictly speaking, they are not actions
or acts – or, alternatively, they correspond to something that was actually done. All
we would need to do to accommodate Bach’s insistence is to say that understanding
intentional behavior in general is directed towards two kinds of objects; action and
inaction.
To be clear, I am arguing that refraining to act on an occasion is in perfectly good
standing, on anyone’s account, when it comes to the automatic attribution of mental
states to intentional agents in explaining their behavior. When I see someone acciden-
tally drop a penny while walking in high-grown grass, stopping only for a fraction of
a second to gaze down, I immediately assume they believe they lost a penny and that
it is pointless to look for it. Arguably, Pennyless (their name) refrained from search-
ing and I, watching, automatically explained this fact to myself by assuming various
things about their mental state. If asked, Pennyless might conrm that searching for
the coin would have been pointless, hence better to decide to do nothing at all. If I
were Pennyless I would have done the same, I might think, and doing the same is the
doing of nothing.
If refraining gures in action explanation generally, it also gures in utterance
explanation in particular. As Clarke (2014 : 32) points out, one of Strunk and White’s
famous dicta in The Elements of Style was “omit needless words.” Clarke adds that,
whenever one complies with this stylistic norm, one brings about the omission of
words by the act of omitting their use. Furthermore, syntactic structure itself provides
for a wealth of low-grade normative properties to capture the sense in which speakers
refrain from uttering one thing in uttering another. So, for example, when I utter (2)
while in Dublin it’s clear to all that I should have added ‘here’ or ‘in Dublin’ if I wished
to be more explicit, and if indeed my plan was to talk about the weather where I was
located. There is a longer construction which I should have used in case I believed the
context called for it. Let’s say, then, that I refrain from saying explicitly where it rains
in uttering (2). My refraining either consists in the absence of an act or it consists in
some short-lived or instantaneous movement or other; quick breath, glance, gesture,
whatever.
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We have, then, candidate acts for being parts of utterances corresponding to aphonic
parts of sentences. Utterances are actions which can, on occasion, be partly consti-
tuted by acts of refraining from saying something explicitly. Moreover, speakers can
easily report on their acts of refraining after the fact. MPs may abstain from voting
and report this by raising a hand or saying “I abstain”. On some views, these latter
actions would actually be spatiotemporally constitutive of the act of abstention but,
as I have said, my argument doesn’t require this assumption. I conclude that it makes
perfectly good sense to say that, on occasion, speakers will intentionally perform the
act of omitting to say explicitly. They do so, for instance, when they utter (2). This
suces to make trouble for Neale’s argument. We have found a candidate to be the
utterance-part corresponding to any plausible aphonic sentence-part. The candidate
plays a signicant role in speakers’ capacities for mindreading, communicating, inter-
preting and explaining intentional action more generally. We could even imagine the
communicative defects one would incur if one were, so to speak, omission-blind, and
could only ever understand action, never inaction. Surely, this would be debilitating.
And, nally, if there is an aphonic location-variable in sentence (2) it can correspond
to the act of refraining from referring explicitly to a place.
2.2 Gaps
And what’s the problem with instantaneous or durationless proper parts of utterances
anyway? As research in phonetics and phonology shows, the correspondence relation
between the abstract sentence or word and their audible utterance proxies is extremely
complex and counterintuitive. This work has, for example, revealed what is sometimes
called the ‘lack of invariance problem,’ namely that there is no one-to-one correspon-
dence between acoustic signals and perceptual categorization into phonetic segments.
In speech perception, dierent acoustic patterns are invariably perceived by hearers as
a single pattern. Speech perception is ‘categorical’ on this way of thinking. The main
reason for this is the phenomenon of coarticulation: the fact that discrete segments of
speech are inuenced acoustically by the immediately preceding or following sounds
uttered. Take the articulation of the /p/ segments in ‘pole’ and ‘peel.’ The dierent
positions of the lips, which is explained by the dierence in the following vowels,
creates dierences in the acoustics. Normally, however, this dierence is not reected
in the hearer’s perception of the utterance (Unnsteinsson 2017).
Another counterintuitive feature, more relevant to our concerns, is that coartic-
ulation occurs both within words and across words in owing speech, resulting in
the fact that, most of the time, gaps between words are not indicated by the continu-
ous speech signal at all. Obviously, this is where inscription is usually very dierent.
So, to take Neale’s example, in uttering (4) the speaker sequentially produces ve
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word-occurrences although the sentence contains only four words.
(4) The cat ate the mouse
Now, let’s just assume the phoneticians and phonologists are right about all of this.
This creates well-known problems about how knowledge of word boundaries is ac-
quired so quickly and eortlessly by children. Yet such knowledge can elude adults
for a long time as well, for particular expressions (looking online for two seconds I
found the example of ‘housechablis’ instead of ‘house Chablis’). But this seems to be
another troublemaker for Neale. When competent speakers utter (4) they will utter
a sentence containing at least four word-gaps indicating that one word has stopped
and another has begun. But the gaps in the sentence will almost never correspond
to any identiable gaps in any utterance of the sentence. The question is: how do
speaker/hearers then learn where one word ends and another one begins? Presum-
ably the answer has something to do with learning to identify similar acoustic patterns
in dierent linguistic contexts. For example, competent speakers will also understand
an utterance of, say, ‘The mouse ate the cat.’ But, of course, it will still be the case that
almost no particular utterance of (4) contains parts corresponding to the word-gaps.
So, competent speakers can utter a sentence with four gaps, understand eortlessly
that the sentence has four gaps, without there being recognizable gaps in the utterance
itself.
But the trouble doesn’t start properly brewing until we reach the level of the phrase
marker. If linguists are to be believed, sentence processing in ordinary speaker/hearers
must involve the mental construction of an abstract syntactic structure. A fully de-
veloped human parser – the internal mechanism for processing sentences – at least
assigns structures encoding various dependency relations between words and phrases
to sentences encountered in speech and writing. In a recent book, David Pereplyotchik
provides a wealth of arguments for the psychological reality of what he calls ‘mental
phrase markers.’ The most telling arguments are based on results from brain-studies
in neurolinguistics, so-called structural priming experiments, and on plausible expla-
nations of garden-path eects. The data strongly suggest that there is an independent
syntactic processing-stage which occurs before any semantic or pragmatic informa-
tion is accessed. And this stage involves the construction of mental phrase markers
identical to those developed by generative grammarians (Pereplyotchik 2017, Ch. 5).
Take structural priming, for instance (see Pickering & Ferreira 2008 for review).
If a speaker encounters and parses a sentence with postulated phrase marker P then,
the theory predicts, P has been activated in the speaker’s mind. If P is activated it
should remain so for a while and should show up in other mental processes. Experi-
ments conrm that there are strong priming eects of this sort. So, if P is primed in
sentence perception it becomes much more likely that a P-sentence is produced later,
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even if semantically equivalent sentences with other phrase markers are equally or
more salient in the context. The human parser, it seems, automatically assigns phrase
constituency structure to sentences.
It’s important to note that, in spite of this, many theorists would argue either
(i) that speakers have no knowledge or beliefs about mental phrase markers; even
that they aren’t mentally represented, or (ii) that any such knowledge or belief is
tacit, subpersonal, subdoxastic, or inaccessible to consciousness.3 Cognition involving
mental phrase markers, on most accounts, does not reach personal-level explanation.
This contrasts with speakers’ beliefs about what they intend to say or refer to on
a given occasion of utterance. For normal humans, it seems trivially true that they
know what they mean by uttering something. They seem, at least, to know some
substantial part of it, as manifested in the capacity to repeat, clarify, or paraphrase
what was meant (although I will criticize this alleged truism in §4). Still, supposing
that competent speakers stand in some cognitive relation to mental phrase markers,
and that the correct theory of this relation either falls into category (i) or (ii), sentences
will have parts with no corresponding parts in the utterance. The most extreme views
in category (i) will surely deny the very existence of mental phrase markers, but we
can set them aside for the moment (see Collins (2007) for a moderate (i)-type view).
Assume, then, that speaker/hearers have tacit knowledge, at least, of the imme-
diate constituents of a sentence. They automatically process sentences in terms of
mental phrase markers. So, speakers tacitly know about NPs and VPs and constituency-
boundaries are even posited as parts of the abstract syntactic structure of a given
sentence. But what, if anything, is the part of an utterance of a sentence which corre-
sponds to the part of the sentence-cum-phrase-marker that distinguishes the VP and
the NP? Given that there are verb-subject-object languages, such as Irish, where the
VP is split by the NP in normal word order (Irish is a VSO language), it’s unclear how
this question could be answered directly. The question falsely presumes that sentence-
parts and utterance-parts that go proxy for sentences stand in simple, isomorphic
mapping relations. Syntactic theory shows that a lot of material is properly said to
be part of the abstract sentence, while having no obvious counterparts in utterances
or inscriptions. So, the fact that some words have this feature as well should not be
objectionable as such.
3See Devitt (2006) for an example of the rst kind of view and Dwyer & Pietroski (1996) for an
example of the second.
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3 Two Arguments for Uttering Aphonics
Neale reports that when he talks of aphonics he is particularly concerned with “. . .
individual expressions that are unpronounced and unheard by their nature, expres-
sions that intrinsically lack phonological features or instructions for pronunciation”
(236, italics in original). The idea seems to be that positing aphonics wouldn’t be the-
oretically exciting unless the lack of phonetic and phonological properties is essential
to the posited expression. Most theorists allow for aphonics in the less substantial
sense in which they are actually phonic expressions that happen to be omitted on
a given occasion. In VP-ellipsis, for example, it is important that what is elided be
identical to the antecedent verb – which can either precede or follow the ellipsis – as
in ‘Sally drove to England and Joe [drove] to Scotland.’ Neale is interested, it seems,
in expressions partly individuated by their lack of phonology, so that trying to utter
them would always result in the production of some distinct expression.
This is unfortunate for a number of reasons, the most important being the fact that
there is no such thing as an intrinsically aphonic expression. Any expression can be
uttered, even if it happens to lack phonetic features or instructions for pronunciation.
What’s more, Neale explicitly recognizes this elsewhere in his paper.
3.1 Uttering
Neale provides a thoroughly intention-based theory of utterance identity. The ques-
tion at issue is a metaphysical one: In virtue of what facts is a given utterance and
acoustic proxy for a given word? Very roughly and relative to “a few reasonable as-
sumptions,” Neale writes that “an utterance u produced by S on a given occasion is
an utterance of expression e i S intended u to be an utterance of e” (265). On the
face of it, this view of utterance identity appears to be incompatible with expressions
which are aphonic ‘by their nature.’ We can plug any allegedly aphonic expression
into Neale’s biconditional and get, as a result, a speaker’s utterance of that aphonic
expression. So, for example, I can intend to utter the aphonic expression ‘PRO’ by
articulating the sound /pro/ on a given occasion.
What’s more, uttering aphonics is in some sense made easier by their lack of pho-
netic features. There denitely is already a standardized way of uttering the aphonic
expression ‘PRO,’ at least within linguistics. But, for other less entrenched cases, such
as location variables, it seems like we can choose any phonemic pattern that would
do the job in the context at hand. Or, in lieu of that, one could utter the expression by
omission, as discussed above. This ts with a theory of speech errors I have defended
elsewhere, which also incorporates a thoroughly intention-based view of utterance
identity (Unnsteinsson 2017). Very roughly, the idea is that when a speaker has expres-
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sion e1 as their target but accidentally produces some other expression e2, the uttered
expression will be a misarticulation of the target expression. It was an odd way, and
accidentally so at that, of uttering the expression which was the speaker’s intended
target. Thus, I could intend to utter ‘Obama’ but accidentally utter ‘Osama.’ On this
theory of speech error, I will have pronounced ‘Obama’ as ‘Osama’ on that occasion.
So, it seems like we have two options, neither of which allows for the possibility
of intrinsically aphonic expressions. First, we could say that any utterance u where
the speaker intends to utter the aphonic e by making u is such that e was in fact
successfully uttered. Since there are no instructions for pronunciation one really can-
not go wrong and anything one does—provided one has e as one’s target in uttering
u—will count as an acoustic proxy for the aphonic. Secondly, we could say that the
correct pronunciation of an aphonic expression is in fact silence. The instructions for
pronunciation indicate that the expression ought to be uttered by making no sound
at all. In eect, this is taking lack of phonetic features to be a kind of phonetic feature.
But we don’t need to choose between the two options, for both support the same
conclusion, as noted before. If we take the second option, all utterances of PRO, for ex-
ample, where the speaker intends to utter PRO by making the sound PRO (or any other
sound) will simply count as a misarticulation of the aphonic. Importantly, however,
and this is clearly part of the intention-based approach to utterance identity, any such
misarticulation will still constitute an utterance of the expression. It follows, then,
that intentionalists must believe that aphonics – though they’re usually not heard in
utterances – can very well be uttered and heard.4
But what on earth would it be like for an ordinary speaker to have an aphonic ex-
pression as their target? And how could some sound they emit constitute an utterance
of that aphonic target? This is part of Neale’s aphonic-intention problem, which I will
discuss more directly below. Let’s consider these questions naively rst. It would seem
like some attempts by ordinary speakers to make themselves absolutely clear because
of prior misunderstanding might be classied as (temporally extended) utterances of
an aphonic like PRO. Say I’m planning a road trip with you and Siobhan and we’re
deciding who shall drive. We’ve been uttering sentences like ‘I want you to drive’ and
‘Siobhan wants me to drive,’ so this syntactic structure is primed and we are thus a
bit more likely to misidentify similar structures. Then I say,
(5) You or Jane wants to drive,
trying to transfer the responsibility for driving over to you or Jane. Primed for mis-
4For a very dierent point of view on this, see Hawthorne & Lepore (2011: 460-465) and Lepore &
Stone (2015: 217-220).
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understanding, you ask: ‘We want who to drive?’5 When I respond Jane is no longer
present. Somewhere along the way, my utterance-plan goes badly awry, but what
comes out of my mouth is something like the following:
(6) ∗I said you or Jane wants yours-her-self to drive
Now, of course it is far from obvious what exactly we should say about this strange
case. Perhaps I had the phonic expression ‘yourself’ rst as a target and then, thinking
I could x the error, I had the phonic expression ‘herself’ as a target. So, didn’t I just
misarticulate those expressions? Probably, yes. But let’s assume PRO exists and is
really an aphonic pronoun controlled, in a case like (5), by the subject of the matrix
verb, i.e. ‘You or Jane.’ Add to that the idea that PRO inherits the reference from its
antecedent. It’s not crazy to suppose, then, that when I made the error and uttered
/yours-her-self/ my target was an expression with exactly those features. I just couldn’t
nd any phonic expression in my mental lexicon which corresponded well to those
features. The problem is that the subject, ‘You or Jane,’ can easily control aphonic PRO,
but it can become awkward with an overt reexive pronoun as in (6).
Still, I don’t want the argument to rest entirely on the plausibility of this kind of
case as it may be judged a bit far-fetched. However, even if ordinary speakers never
have an intention to, as we might say, give phonetic realization to an aphonic, it is
arguable that experts both could and routinely have such intentions. When linguists
or philosophers utter or inscribe ‘Wanda wants PRO to win’ or ‘It’s raining in x’ one
possible description of what they’re doing is that they are uttering or inscribing the
posited aphonic expression. To support this, I see no logical or metaphysical impossi-
bility in the idea that after a few decades the use of PRO would catch on in the general
population. This is, of course, terribly unlikely, and even more so in the cases which
are of particular interest to philosophers, like the ideas of aphonic location-variables
or modes of presentation.
There is, however, an obvious objection which is implicit in Neale’s own paper. As
he notes, when linguists write PRO in a sentence, it’s part of their structural description
of the sentence (243). So, one could say, rather than uttering or inscribing the aphonic
expression, what linguists are doing is describing, or perhaps simply naming, the
expression. Indeed, since the postulated expression has no phonic properties it stands
to reason that the expression is either named or described, not uttered or inscribed, and
that this is what the experts intend. I want to fully acknowledge the strength of this
point but, it’s equally clear, it still doesn’t amount to showing that aphonic expressions
like PRO or variables for locations are aphonic ‘by their nature.’ If intentionalism about
5If the misunderstanding involved here sounds implausible, just imagine this all happening over
walkie-talkie in a movie from the 80s.
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utterance identity is assumed, experts can certainly utter these expressions if they
want to.
In his discussion, Neale introduces PRO as “silent self ” which corresponds to
what he calls “stilted-‘self’” but he makes clear that he thinks they must be dierent
expressions. And it’s clear why he thinks this: one is by its nature aphonic and the
other is an odd or stilted extension of the phonic word ‘self’ into a set of unfamiliar
syntactic distributions, namely exactly the distribution of PRO or silent self. It follows
from Neale’s assumptions – although, as already noted, it’s not compatible with his
notion of utterance identity – that silent self and stilted-‘self’ are dierent. The former
is not stilted and the latter is not silent (243). But why suppose that this is a robust
criterion for individuating words? Well, we shouldn’t suppose so. Before arguing for
this claim, and responding properly to the objection from structural descriptions, we
need to go through the second argument for the claim that there are no intrinsically
aphonic expressions.
3.2 Uttering What?
Let’s agree with Neale that words are abstract artifacts, along with things like laws and
conventions. Agree also that word-proxies or tokenings of words are not words (see
his Section 6). But can the nature of words as abstract artifacts be described in more
detail? It would appear so. Wolfram Hinzen and Michelle Sheehan (2015) argue, for
example, that there are four important notions of ‘word’ all of which play signicant
roles in current linguistics.6
First, there is the notion of the word as a prosodic unit (the ‘phonological
word’); then there is the notion of the semantic word or lexeme, which is
the word understood as an abstract vocabulary item with a given meaning
that can take dierent forms, such as the verb run, which can take the
forms runs, ran, run, etc. Even more abstract is the notion of a lexical
root, which involves a semantic core possibly shared across lexemes of
dierent categories, e.g. the root √run as involved in the verb run and
the homophonous noun run, which occurs in the expressions a run, many
runs, running, Mary runs, etc. Finally, there is the grammatical word: the
word as a morphosyntactic unit or as functioning in a sentence context.
(38, italics in original)
Neale agrees with Kaplan (1990, 2011) and others that the rst unit on this list is
not what we’re looking for when asking about the metaphysics of words. Of course,
6Thanks to James Miller for alerting me to this passage (Miller, ‘The Metaphysics of Words,’ un-
published).
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there exists such a prosodic unit, but it’s clear that there are psychologically real
and important distinctions between phonologically and phonetically identical words.
More importantly still, prosodic units can change so dramatically over time that their
individuation is problematic. Kaplan (2011) and Hawthorne and Lepore (2011) argue
for something like a lexeme-based theory of word identity. On their account, then,
words are essentially objects with certain syntactic markers or properties as well as
semantic ones: they are verbs or nouns for instance. As Hinzen and Sheehan (2015)
point out, the category of lexeme is almost identical to what many philosophers call
‘concepts.’ Then there is also the more abstract notion of lexical root, which is shared by
dierent lexemes. Finally, there are morphosyntactic units, characterized, for example,
by the position the unit occupies in a phrase-structure tree or the manner in which it
interacts with various axes.
This provides a wealth of possibilities for how philosophers could dene words.
The correct metaphysics of words might incorporate any combination of these four
properties, and of course, which ones are appropriated may depend on the theoretical
purposes at hand. Most theorists seem agreed that, when individuating words for
the purposes of describing the items stored in the mental lexicon, prosodic units are
not terribly important. There certainly are prosodic units but they are non-basic. It’s
reasonable to suppose, then, that a metaphysical theory of word identity will always
incorporate at least one of three properties: (i) being lexemic, (ii) having a lexical root,
and (iii) having a morphosyntactic prole. Words don’t need phonetic realization
– because we are assuming that there are aphonics – and whatever phonological
properties they have can change dramatically, uctuate or even disappear. Semantic
properties of words allow for similarly dramatic uctuations over time.
But here Neale’s point about the dierence between silent self and stilted-‘self’
may seem relevant: Wouldn’t aphonic and phonic units always constitute distinct
expressions? No, they would merely be distinct prosodic units, because all of the other
properties could still remain intact. Again, as a comparison, does an expression with
semantic properties become a dierent expression if it evolves into an expletive, ‘non-
semantic’ unit? For instance, is expletive ‘it’ distinct from ‘it’ occurring as argument?
The answer to these two questions would depend on whether or not one endorses the
lexeme-based view of word identity. But the answer to the former, it seems, has to be
a direct ‘No.’ Phonetic and phonological properties are supercial, non-basic features
of words. Therefore, there is no such thing as an intrinsically aphonic expression.
Now we are also in a position to respond to the objection mentioned near the end
of Section 3.1 above. According to the objection, when experts appear to be uttering
aphonic expressions like PRO, silent-self, or variables for location, what they are really
doing is providing structural descriptions or merely naming the aphonic item. Well,
if both of my arguments are sound, this is seen to be unduly ad hoc. If phonological
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properties are supercial and utterance identity is determined by speakers’ intentions,
nothing hinders experts in intending the production of a particular sound as the
utterance of some postulated aphonic expression.7 Before, I gave reasons to think
that if such expressions exist at all, the omission of any phonic counterpart in an
utterance may count as an act of uttering an aphonic. I believe it is dicult to nd
credible cases of non-expert speakers in fact having intentions to utter an aphonic by
producing some sound or other. Doing so, however, is open to the experts themselves.
All I needed to show is that no word – apart from mere ‘phonological words’ of course
– is aphonic by its very nature and, so, it is ne if it turns out that experts normally
consider themselves only to be describing or naming aphonics, rather than actually
giving voice to them. But when they in fact intend to utter the aphonic by producing
some sound or other, the identity of the word in question isn’t suddenly altered.
4 What About the Meaning-Intention Problem?
According to Schier and Neale, there is a signicant dierence between theories on
which speakers have intentions to refer implicitly to something like a rain-location
and ones on which they have intentions to refer implicitly to modes of presentation
or epistemic standards. When it comes to rain, speakers seem immediately and eort-
lessly aware that they in fact intended to refer to a location even if they omitted any
expression whose function is specically to enable such reference. Ordinarily, when
speakers say that it’s raining, they’ll have no trouble answering the question ‘Where
is it raining?’ if it is somehow unclear in the context. So, it may seem, we have good
reason to suppose that speakers actually have intentions to implicitly refer.
Modes of presentation appear to be dierent. Many philosophers wish to posit
modes of presentation to solve puzzles about singular reference. According to one
inuential theory of this sort, when speakers attribute beliefs to others with sentences
like (7),
(7) Bianca believes that the hippopotamus is sleeping,
they really express the proposition that Bianca believes, under some mode of presen-
tation, that the hippopotamus is sleeping. So, uttering a sentence like (7) involves
implicit reference to something called a mode of presentation (see Neale 2016, §14.4
for details). But, on the face of it, speakers are not aware of intending anything of
7There is one other possibility, however. One might simply argue that aphonics aren’t expressions at
all, that they are much more like phrase structure trees, Case, and other parts of the syntactic description
of sentences. I nd this possibility appealing, but won’t address it here, as it would take us too far into
dierent territory.
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the sort. If the speaker were asked to specify which mode of presentation they had in
mind in uttering (7) the question would usually not be understood. Maybe there are
more intuitive ways to get at the question, which would better track what theorists
have in mind by positing these modes, but still, the dierence between this case and
the rst one will remain. Normal speakers are completely aware that they implicitly
refer to locations all the time, but, if they do indeed refer to modes of presentation – or
epistemic standards, according to Schier – they haven’t the faintest idea that that’s
what they’re doing. It follows, then, that only cases of the rst kind are compatible
with the assumption that speakers have transparent, privileged access to what they
consciously mean, intend, and believe in uttering something. And it is reasonable,
Schier contends, to think that such access is “part of a normal person’s functional
architecture” (1992: 515; Neale 2016: 320).
Neale argues that aphonic reference presents an even deeper problem (2016, §14.7).
Indeed, if there are theorists who hold that speakers refer to modes of presentationwith
aphonic expressions, it follows that they refer to things they don’t know about with
things they don’t know about. So, Neale asks, is it really plausible to attribute aphonic-
involving referential intentions to speakers at all? Keeping with the example from
before, it is fairly clear that ordinary speakers don’t appear to have conscious beliefs or
intentions about things like PRO. Linguists didn’t discover PRO until very late in the
history of natural languages where PRO is allegedly part of some sentences, so speak-
ers’ access to expressions like PRO is very dierent from their access to expressions
like ‘eejit.’ The logical conclusion, then, seems to be that positing aphonic-involving
intentions is also incompatible with Schier’s assumption that normal speakers have
privileged access to what they mean, intend, and believe in uttering something.
Obviously, then, the degree to which these problems are worrying should match
the degree to which the transparency assumption is in fact justied. More precisely,
there are at least three hidden assumptions at work here:
A1. Speakers have transparent, privileged access to what they consciously
intend, mean, and believe in uttering something.
A2. What speakers consciously intend, mean, and believe in uttering some-
thing is identical to what they really intend, mean, and believe in uttering
something.
A3. Interpretation and inference are not necessary in understanding what
one oneself intends, means, and believes in uttering something, but they
are necessary in understanding what others intend, mean, and believe in
uttering something.
Intention-based semantics, as promulgated by Neale and Schier, is thoroughly wed-
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ded to A1-A3. This is unfortunate, not only because it will appear to critics that there
is no such thing as intentionalism without broadly Cartesian views of the mental,
but also because there are good reasons to commit transparency to the ames. Or
so I will argue, along lines essentially similar to Neale’s “Tacit States Reply” to the
meaning-intention problem (2016, §14.12).
4.1 Aphonic-Involving Intentions
Let’s start with the alleged problem with aphonic-involving intentions before ap-
proaching the broader question of meaning-intentions. As stated, the problem is that
speakers would be supposed to perform acts of meaning, saying, referring, etc., with-
out knowing anything at all about the means with which they do so. Clearly, PRO and
other aphonic expressions will t the bill; normal speakers don’t appear to have any
conscious knowledge that such entities exist. On the other hand, speakers appear to
know that words exist and they appear to know that words and sentences are means
by which they express and communicate their thoughts and beliefs to others.
That may indeed sound reasonable, but only because it is part of folk linguistics and
general common sense opinion. If any account of the nature of words along the lines
of §3.2 above is correct, normal speakers have no idea what a word is, because they
have no idea what a lexeme, root, or morphosyntactic unit is. But this objection is too
quick. Surely, no one would suggest that naïve speakers know the true metaphysics of
words, what they do know is that there is something in the world, namely utterances
of words and sentences, with which people communicate. And nothing similar can
be said about their knowledge of utterances of aphonic expressions.
The deeper problem with this argument is that it draws an illicit distinction be-
tween words on the one hand and aphonics on the other. For if we are to accept
aphonics at all, they will belong in the category of words; they are merely words
without phonetic or phonological properties. So, if we really want to take folk lin-
guistics seriously, naïve speakers will turn out to know about aphonics in virtue of
their admittedly supercial knowledge of words in general. Neale, it seems, would
have to draw some principled distinction between phonic expressions and aphonic
expressions. This would allow him to hold that normal speakers have only encoun-
tered utterances of the phonic bit of the lexicon and, so, they only have knowledge of
words as phonic entities. Aphonics are completely beyond their ken.
Apart from the problems already mentioned, especially the point that normal
speakers may have encountered aphonics in speech by witnessing acts of omitting
to say something explicitly, drawing this distinction is not as easy as it seems. To see
this, consider some of the most basic theoretical commitments of linguists who pursue
an intentionalist theory of phonological competence. Bromberger and Halle (2000),
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for example, argue that phonological descriptions or derivations of dated utterances
should not be understood merely as phonetic transcriptions of a speech event—i.e. sym-
bols encoding articulatory movements—but as standing for a sequence of intentions
which give rise to those movements. Simplifying dramatically, the IPA transcription
[ô
¯
wEd], occurring in a phonological derivation of an utterance, doesn’t merely record
the phonetic segmentation of an event of uttering ‘red’ into the three stages of (i)
labialized postalveolar approximant, (ii) open-mid front unrounded vowel and, nally,
(iii) voiced alveolar stop. It represents the phonetic intention that called for this com-
plex sequence of articulatory movements and positionings. This kind of intention is
grounded in linguistic competence, since speakers can very well make the requisite
sounds and movements encoded by [ô
¯
wEd] without having the intention to utter a
word of English, for example if they don’t know the language but just happened to
produce the sound in the manner required. Phonetic intentions are intentions, then,
to produce speech sounds of specic languages.
But what, more specically, are the objects of phonetic intentions? According to
Bromberger and Halle (2000: 26-27), speakers must, at least, have intentions to produce
morphemes. A morpheme is either a stem or an ax of a word; ‘an-arch-ic’, for exam-
ple, has two axes, ‘an’ (prex), and ‘ic’ (sux), and one stem, ‘arch’. A single stem, on
this kind of theory, can be pronounced dierently in dierent linguistic environments.
The stem ‘sell’ is sometimes pronounced /sold/ and sometimes /sells/, depending on
tense and Case agreement. So, whenever I intend to produce a phonic word I retrieve
information about each morpheme from memory, and utter the resulting combination
or transformation. Now, we have already attributed intentions to speakers which will
be completely unrecognizable to them. Normal speakers usually do not, and need not,
know anything at all about the morphemic structure of the words they use. Neither
do they need to know that morphemes exist; and they normally don’t know. Neverthe-
less, very basic commitments in (some of) phonological theory involve the attribution
of intentions to pronounce morphemes to ordinary speakers. It seems, then, that the
assumption of transparency would require a wholesale rejection of these ideas, or
very radical revision of foundational assumptions. Neither option is appealing, since
dropping transparency seems the easier thing to do (see next section).
Before moving on, it should be noted that adding just one layer of complexity into
this analysis will make phonetic intentions to utter phonics appear just as problem-
atic as phonetic intentions to utter aphonics. Plural and past-tense axes in English
have radically dierent phonological features in dierent environments. Consider the
examples from Bromberger and Halle (2000: 27):
Plural morpheme: cat/s, child/ren, kibbutz/im, alumn/i, stigma/ta, geese,
moose
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Past-tense morpheme: bake/d, playe/d, dream/t, sol/d, sang, hit
To explain these irregular axes, they propose a category of abstract morphemes
symbolized with the letter Q. Q has no direct phonetic interpretation but, as I under-
stand the idea, it encodes information about how the morpheme is pronounced (it is
an ‘identifying index’). Bromberger and Halle take care to note that ‘Q’ is part of the
notation of the theory, and not a symbol that really occurs ‘in the mind’ of the speaker.
But this is at best an admission that we simply lack knowledge in this area, since they
expect more work in linguistics will eventually reveal mental structures correspond-
ing to representations in the notation of the theory (2000: 26n10). The bottom line,
however, is that speakers of English do utter plural and past-tense morphemes, and
they must then, in some sense to be explained, intend to utter Q. But it appears that Q
either doesn’t encode any phonological information, because the phonetics of Q are
so radically dissimilar on dierent occasions of utterance, or the information is almost
impossible to specify, even theoretically. Further, it is part of one fairly inuential
theory of phonological competence that when speakers intend to utter some phonics,
they must intend to utter abstract morphemes like Q. Thus, I conclude, it has not been
shown that intentions to utter aphonics have to be more problematic than intentions
to utter phonics.
4.2 Access to Propositional Attitudes
The argument, so far, may seem to amount to no more than simple buck-passing.
Surely, one would like to say, there is a world of dierence between conscious, personal-
level intentions like the intention to mean that p by uttering X and any subpersonal
intention or other mental state involved in knowing the grammar of a language. And
so, the thought continues, we haven’t solved any problem by attributing, say, phonetic
intentions to speakers and hearers. Indeed, there is much reason to think that this
is merely a façon de parler awaiting elimination when science progresses (Collins
2007, 2008). True, this is a popular and plausible way of thinking about these issues
but, I want to argue, the problems involved in personal-level intention attribution are
much more pressing and consequential than many philosophers of language have
hitherto allowed for. Possibly, speakers are built to consciously represent themselves,
to themselves, as having certain intentions and beliefs, without this being a good
indicator that those are the intentions or beliefs that they actually have. If so, talking in
terms of ‘conscious intentions’ is also just a manner of speaking awaiting elimination.
Start with the nutshell description of Gricean intention-based semantics, or in-
tentionalism for short, coming from Neale, Schier and others. According to inten-
tionalism, what the speaker says and means by making an utterance on an occasion
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is metaphysically determined by certain specic audience-directed intentions. What
is strictly said by the speaker may need to conform, in some sense, to the linguistic
meaning of the sentence uttered, but what is otherwise meant – e.g. conversational
implicatures – can roam freely from any such constraint. So, for instance, if I utter,
(8) Meet me at the bank,
the only facts that can determine whether I meant a river bank or a nancial institution
are facts about my communicative intention at the time of utterance. The context
could be such as to make it appear to my audience that I meant the river bank – if
I’m holding a shing rod, for example – even if I really intend to refer to a nancial
institution, and so they might very well misunderstand me. And in many such cases
the responsibility for the misunderstanding falls squarely on the speaker’s shoulders;
they failed to take the full context into consideration before speaking. But it is still
the intention that determines which interpretation is the correct one. Neale (2005:
179-180) describes this in terms of an epistemic asymmetry between the speaker and
hearer. Speakers know what they mean and the hearer’s job is to work it out. The
speaker normally doesn’t need to work this out, they simply know what they mean
without interpretation or inference.
Already, I believe, it is important to pry this apart. Even if it is conceded that
speakers normally know what they mean, or some part of it, this must be agged as
a thesis in the epistemology of interpretation. According to intentionalism, what I
said in uttering (8) on an occasion is determined by my communicative intention, it is
not determined—except in the epistemological sense of that word—by what I believe
I intended to say. Neither is it determined by what I believe my intention is while
uttering (8). Sure, I could nd out what my intention was in uttering (8) by forming
a belief about the intention. The dierence between the hearer and myself here is, at
least, that I often have access to more data – my own mental imagery at the time for
example – and may often form my belief without waiting to hear the words I utter.
Perhaps this higher-order belief is formed automatically and unconsciously, but it can
surely be mistaken like any other belief. Note, however, that more data does not nec-
essarily result in more reliable judgment, as it might just overwhelm one’s cognitive
system and lead to an increased number of errors. Sometimes, cognitive processes
are more reliable if they use only a limited collection of evidence (Gigerenzer et al.
1999; Carruthers 2011: 24). Further, as Peter Carruthers (2011, Ch. 2.5; also pp. 12,
22, 70) has argued, Cartesian transparency derives no support from phenomenologi-
cal observation, contrary to widespread opinion. Beliefs about what others mean in
uttering something are formed just as automatically and sub-consciously as beliefs
about what we ourselves mean, intend, or believe. And we have often formed those
beliefs as hearers, automatically and predictively, before the speaker puts a stop to the
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sentence or even before they say anything. And this is predicted by so-called ‘forward
models’ of human cognition (e.g., Pickering & Clark 2014). Normally, people simply
nd themselves with beliefs about what speakers meant, with no insight into how
exactly the belief was formed. We seem also simply to nd ourselves with such beliefs
about our own propositional attitudes.
4.2.1 Arguments from Modularity
As Carruthers (2011) argues at length, there are good empirical and theoretical rea-
sons to think that the human mind—or a specic mindreading module in the mind—
automatically adheres to cognitive procedures which assume the mind is transparent
to itself. If so, it is just a near-universal assumption of humans that if one thinks one
is in mental state M then one must actually be in mental state M and, also, that if
one thinks one is not in mental state M then one must really not be in that mental
state (ibid., p. 12). This cognitive procedure is compatible with the suggestion that, in
fact, people routinely confabulate and misinterpret their own mental states. And ex-
perimental ndings indicate that when such confabulation occurs, people don’t have
subjective access to the information that their self-attribution of a mental state was a
complete fabrication. Carruthers takes, as an example, research on commissurotomy
patients, where dierent stimuli are presented to the two hemispheres at the same
time.
The patient xated his eyes on a point straight ahead, while two cards were
ashed up, one positioned to the left of xation (which would be available
only to the right hemisphere) and on to the right of xation (which would
be available only to the left hemisphere). When the instruction, “Walk!”
was ashed to the right brain, the subject got up and began to walk out of
the testing van. (The right hemisphere of this subject was capable of some
limited understanding of words, but, had no production abilities.) When
asked where he was going, he (the left brain, which controlled speech-
production as well as housing a mindreading system) replied, “I’m going
to get a Coke from the house.” This attribution of a current intention to
himself was plainly confabulated, since the actual reason for initiating
the action was accessible only to the right hemisphere. Yet it was deliv-
ered with all of the condence and seeming introspective obviousness as
normal. (2011: 39-40)
Even if patients are reminded, and made fully aware, that the surgery can have eects
on their access to their own mental states, they still insist that they know for sure
what they really intend to do. As Carruthers emphasizes, this does not support total
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skepticism about self-knowledge, but it does show that confabulated mental states
will appear just as transparently accessible to us as their authentic counterparts.
Now, let’s look again at the transparency assumptions A1-A3, starting with the
nal one.
A3. Interpretation and inference are not necessary in understanding what
one oneself intends, means, and believes in uttering something, but they
are necessary in understanding what others intend, mean, and believe in
uttering something.
As already noted, this assumption gets no support from intuition or rst-person phe-
nomenology, since the cognitive process by which we form beliefs about the intentions
of others is just as immediate and automatic as that by which we form such beliefs
about ourselves. But more substantively, as Carruthers (2011) argues, if one likes the
idea that the mind houses a mindreading module specically geared towards the task
of attributing mental states to intentional agents, some very serious empirical argu-
ments can be mustered against A3. I will only give the avor of these arguments here,
and go on to focus more directly on assumptions A1 and A2.
First, assume that there is a mental module for mindreading. Secondly, we can
then ask: What is our best theory of the nature and evolution of this module? This is
where Carruthers would introduce his interpretive sensory-access (ISA) account of
mindreading, according to which the module only has sensory access to its domain,
and this access is always – with two notable exceptions, namely aspects of perceptual
and emotion-like states (2011, Ch. 4, 5) – interpretive rather than transparent. And so,
the ISA theory predicts that when one attributes propositional attitudes traditionally
so-called – intention, belief, judgment, desire, etc. – one must engage in interpretation
in both self-attributions and other-attributions. This prediction derives some support
from the observation that a mindreading module is most likely to have evolved in
response to strong social pressures on individuals to acquire capacities to predict
and explain the complex and varied behavior of other individuals. If this is in fact
the most plausible evolutionary story we can tell, the simplest hypothesis, according
to Carruthers, “. . . is that self-knowledge is achieved by turning one’s mindreading
capacities on oneself” (2011: 65). And this, in turn, would suggest that our access to
our own mental states is, in essence, the same as our access to the mental states of
others, namely by means of inferences based on various sensory cues. In our own case,
the data pool will usually be very dierent, however, involving many private mental
episodes and access to personal memory.8
8Of course it should be noted that this story is contested, most obviously by simulation theorists
like Goldman (2006) who argue that self-directed metacognitive abilities are evolutionarily prior to
other-directed mindreading abilities.
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4.2.2 Arguments from Dual System Psychology
Whatever one thinks about modules for mindreading, there is a strong case to be made
against Cartesian transparency on the basis of dual system theories in psychology, or
‘fragmentational’ theories of mind more generally. By now it is a fairly standard view,
but certainly not universal, in the cognitive sciences that the human mind has a fast,
intuitive, automatic, and nonconscious processing component and a more eortful,
reective, and conscious component which is subject to voluntary control (cf. Evans
& Frankish 2009).9 Call the rst ‘System 1’ and the second ‘System 2’. There is much
controversy about how exactly the two Systems relate to one another and how they
ought to be dened. System 1, or parts of it, is evolutionarily ancient and is shared with
some non-human animals. System 2 is thought to be more distinctively human or, at
least, more developed in humans than in other animals. Either the Systems are distinct
capacities with dierent evolutionary histories and physical realizations or they are
dierent ways of utilizing the same cognitive resources, with System 2 operations
partly realized in System 1 processes (Carruthers 2009; 2011: 98-101).
Either way, however, if mental partition of this sort is granted, we can inquire
into the characteristics of content-bearing mental states as they occur in System 1 or
System 2 processing respectively. Philosophers have recently, for example, been very
interested in cases where people sincerely profess to deeply held attitudes – e.g. egal-
itarianism, anti-racism – while unreective, ‘System 1-based’ behavior and cognition
seems to manifest diametrically opposed attitudes (Gendler 2008; Schwitzgebel 2010).
The possibility of such cases should not be taken as proof that there are two mental
Systems or two fundamentally dierent species of propositional attitude (Gigerenzer
& Regier 1996; Mandelbaum 2016), but they are helpful in understanding the status
and interaction of dierent kinds of content-bearing states of mind. To x ideas, call
contentful mental states occurring in System 1 processes ‘A-attitudes’ or ‘A-states’ and
those occurring in System 2 processes ‘B-attitudes’ or ‘B-states’. A-states are ancient,
automatic, and (perhaps) associative while B-states are bookkeepers who, normally
lagging behind, strive to be boss over A-states. Tamar Gendler (2008) calls A-state
beliefs ‘aliefs’ and B-state beliefs ‘beliefs’ but I prefer my own terminology for sake
of generality; now we get to talk about A-intentions vs B-intentions, and so on.
Start with beliefs. Suppose an individual S has the B-belief that not p and seems
9If such a heavy-duty psychological theory, much of which is hotly contested, is not allowed as
an assumption, we could make do with a fragmentational or partitive theory of the mind (as in Lewis
1982; Davidson 1982; Egan 2008; Mandelbaum 2016). All we really need is the idea that propositional
attitudes can be causally isolated from one another within a single mind, making it possible for a single
mind to harbor inconsistent beliefs or intentions at any given point in time. Many theorists nd the
System 1/System 2 distinction relatively intuitive, so I use it here.
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also to know full well that S has that very belief. Of course, S need not realize that
the belief is a B-belief since S may not make the A/B-distinction. It’s possible, then,
that S also has the A-belief that p, directly contradicting the content of S’s B-belief.
For example, S could be an implicit or unconscious racist, A-believing that other races
are inferior, while B-believing that they are not. S’s B-belief will consist in things like
S consciously and intentionally professing to egalitarian and anti-racist attitudes. S
may even rehearse, in inner speech, the conscious B-belief that other races are not
inferior. But, surely, this is compatible with the opposing A-belief being manifested in
reasoning, action, and automatic reactions to relevant situations. Finally, there is no
longer a clear sense in which S knows that S believes that other races are not inferior.
For, one might think, genuine belief should require at least the presence of A-belief.
We might say instead, in this kind of case, that S merely knows that S professes to
believe that not p while really believing that p. Often, the real belief will turn out to
be ‘nonconscious,’ but this doesn’t seem necessary (Frankish 2016; Hunter 2011).
As Keith Frankish (2004) and Carruthers (2011) have argued, using dierent termi-
nology, B-beliefs are much more like commitments than truthful reports of contentful
mental states. When I say to myself, or to others, that I believe p, I commit myself
to this belief. More specically, if I happen to take such commitments seriously, I
measure myself according to the standard of believing that p: I aim to make my be-
havior expressive of the belief, experience disappointment when this fails, and exhort
myself to stand by my word. Importantly, however, even if my commitment results in
everything appearing as if I really believe p, commitment is not identical to belief. Un-
less, perhaps, one is a full-blown instrumentalist or anti-realist about content-bearing
mental states. Let’s commit to ignoring such views for the time being. To see the point,
one just needs to note the relativity and variability of commitment-attitudes across
dierent individuals and across dierent times for the same individual. Many people
routinely commit to things without having any apparent control over relevant be-
havior or reasoning. So, it seems, the causal prole of commitment-attitudes depends
entirely on which other higher-order attitudes are held by the person in question; in
the case of belief it may depend on whether they believe they actually have made the
commitment, whether they want, generally, to make good on their commitments, and
so on.
This immediately contrasts with the causal prole of belief, where the question
of whether one really has a belief does not depend on attitudes of this kind. And,
Carruthers (2011: 102-107) argues, the same thought applies to decisions, judgments,
wonderings, and supposings. An actual decision to do something should “settle the
matter” by itself, while saying to oneself that one will do it—committing to it—only
does so in concert with the right beliefs and desires. Surely, committing to the truth
of p may result, in due course, in the A-belief that p. And, generally, self-attribution of
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the belief that p may be self-fullling in that it gives rise to various pressures on one to
behave as if the attribution is true. But committing and believing are still importantly
dierent. Further, one’s commitment-attitudes are seriously vulnerable to systematic
and immediate confabulation as well as self-directed propaganda and deception, for
example in the service of perpetuating a certain self-image (Wilson 2002).10 I may
commit to p being true because of wishful thinking, B-believing sincerely that I A-
believe that p (assuming I have the concept of A-belief), while not really A-believing
anything of the sort.
Now, how could this apply to cases like appearing to know what one means in say-
ing something on a particular occasion? Surely this is dierent from having automatic
or non-introspectible attitudes; when one means that p by uttering X one consciously
intends to mean that p and has fairly reliable knowledge that this is so, right? Re-
member, however, that the point is not to show that speakers never know what they
mean, only that their access to what they mean is interpretive, inferential and prone
to error, just like their access to what others mean. And what I have tried to show
is that even if speakers know what they B-intend, it doesn’t follow that they know
what they A-intend. Further, it is quite likely that the contents of A-intentions dier
radically and systematically from the contents of B-intentions, even when both are
occurrent attitudes a speaker has in making an utterance. So, the idea goes, speakers
may A-intend the proposition that p while actually B-intending the proposition that
q. What counts as successful interpretation, on this kind of view, is not completely
obvious. But one possibility is that recognizing the A-intention is sucient by itself,
while recognizing the B-intention is not, because it only gives the hearer knowledge
of what the speaker consciously believes about the content of the intention. But surely,
this is often a good indicator of belief-contents, or some parts of such contents, and
will normally be good enough for purposes of everyday communication. But this is
all very abstract. Let’s consider two kinds of cases where there is, arguably, an actual
mismatch between communicative A-intentions and communicative B-intentions.
Hypnosis. As Carruthers (2011: 342-343; citing Wegner 2002) reports, subjects who
are given instructions while hypnotized will invent new intentions when asked to ex-
plain why the do what they do after waking from the hypnotic trance. It is likely, then,
that subjects form intentions and make decisions to act while under hypnosis, and
those intentions remain active when they regain consciousness. The intention, say, to
10In Kent Bach’s (1981) terminology, believing that p is dierent from thinking that p. So, if I believe
that p but want to deceive myself into not believing that p I can ll my mind with thoughts to the eect
that p is false, whenever I have occasion to consider my belief. This does not necessarily change my
belief, but it may result in self-deception, that is, my conscious thoughts and imaginings will only ever
suggest that I believe that p is false, when I really believe it is true. Commitment is more like merely
thinking to oneself than really believing.
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open the book on the table when you see it, may have been implanted while hypno-
tized but, when asked why you opened the book, you will automatically form some
confabulated belief; that you’ve always wanted to read Anthony Huxley’s Illustrated
History of Gardening, for instance.
To control for merely pragmatic reasons for subjects to report some reason or other
– when they don’t really know why they are performing the post-hypnotic action
– Carruthers suggests that even ambiguous actions would lead to error prone self-
interpretation. So, out of two possible interpretations, the subject would self-ascribe
the action which is more plausible in the context, without detecting any mismatch
between A/B-intentions. He proposes an experiment where the bodily movements
of the subject will be ambiguous between waving goodbye to someone and waving
away a bug. But we can also go back to our ‘bank’-example above. Suppose we have
a hypnotized subject, Beatrix, who is already fairly likely to take money to the bank,
and likely to go shing on the river bank. Suppose, then, that the hypnotist instructs
her as follows: “You’re holding your daughter’s money box to make a deposit into
her savings account. When you meet Abigail tell her you’re going to the bank, so
she can join you there.” Let’s also assume that this is sucient to implant, in Beatrix,
the A-intention to tell Abigail to come along to the nancial bank and that this very
intention remains active after she emerges from hypnosis. When she is then placed in
a situation where the other sense of ‘bank’ is much likelier to be at play, the current
prediction is that she would form a B-intention to tell Abigail that she’s going to the
river bank. Assume, for example, that Abigail and Beatrix are much more likely to go
shing than to go to a nancial institution and that, when they meet, they’re close to
the river bank and Beatrix is holding her shing rod (as well as her daughter’s money
box).
A competing description of this case is, surely, that the conscious A-intention to
refer to a river bank always supplants the alleged B-intention. But I see this as no
more than banging one’s Cartesian head against the wall. That is to say, if intuitions
of rst-person transparency are not allowed to carry weight, both descriptions are at
least prima facie plausible, and the issue should be decided by more general theoretical
considerations. So, it seems possible that both Beatrix and Abigail misrepresented and
misunderstood the former’s (A-)intention when she uttered ‘bank’.
Implicature and illocution. According to intentionalism, conversational implicature
is determined by the speaker’s communicative intention on the occasion of utterance.
The question of whether or not I conversationally implicate the proposition in (10) by
uttering (9) in a particular context is, thus, answered by nding out whether I actually
intended to be understood as talking about an open gas station or a closed one (see
Grice 1989: 32).
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(9) There is a gas station around the corner
(10) that the gas station is open
Implicature breeds plausible deniability. If it turns out that the gas station is closed
and, having been reprimanded for misleadingly implying that it was open, I am free
to insist that no such thing as (10) was intended. Importantly, however, I am either
telling the truth or not. I may have actually intended to implicate (10), succeeded, and
then lied about my intention when I realized (10) wasn’t true. Alternatively, I may not
have intended to implicate that (10) by uttering (9); that’s why my later denial can be
plausible, for it could, as far as the hearer knows, be true.
But plausible deniability, in turn, breeds credulous self-deception, or so I argue. If
it is easy to deny, when challenged, that something was part of one’s intention, it is
also easy to believe that it actually wasn’t, even when this is a form of self-deception.
A single propositional attitude only relates to behavior in concert with other attitudes.
So, I will only take the umbrella when I believe it’s raining if, among other things, I also
don’t want to get wet. But suppose I don’t really believe it’s raining and I erroneously
self-ascribe the belief that it’s raining. As Carruthers (2011: 94) points out, I can still
explain why I didn’t take my umbrella, while preserving the basic belief – consisting
in a near-universally shared cognitive procedure – that my mind is introspectively
transparent to itself. I can simply say, to myself, that I really wanted to get wet or that
I briey forgot about the rain while leaving the house. Similarly, if people are put in
a situation where it is better – for their self-image or because of social pressure, say –
to form the false belief that they didn’t intend to imply something or other, they will
probably tend to form exactly that belief, immediately and unconsciously.
Consider, by way of example, an argument between a conservative and a liberal
about immigration policy. In conversation, Conn has been advocating tight restrictions
on the free movement of labor, while Libby wants to abolish national borders. Without
articulating explicitly how the statement relates to the more general issue, Conn says,
(11) But the Polish are hard-working.
In this context, Libby may think that Conn is, by uttering (11), implying or presup-
posing something like: (i) other groups of immigrants are not hard-working, or: (ii)
groups of immigrants should only be allowed to enter the country if they have certain
character traits, hard-working being one of them, or even: (iii) non-whites are not
hard-working (this would require the conversational salience of non-white immigrant
groups). And it is not hard to conceive that Conn really did intend to imply one of
(i)-(iii) but, equally, in order to preserve an anti-racist self-image, he could deceive
himself into consciously thinking that no such thing as (iii) was really intended. Conn
could think to himself before uttering (11): I won’t be implying anything like (iii)
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because I don’t believe (iii). But he might still A-believe something like (iii). So, in
such a case, plausible deniability becomes a tool for easy self-deception. Unconscious
A-intentions and conscious B-intentions come apart.
Consider also the illocutionary force of an utterance. Rae Langton (2009: 33-34)
argues that speakers sometimes perform illocutionary acts they don’t actually intend
to perform. Taking an example from J.L. Austin (1975), she imagines one man saying
to another,
(12) Shoot her,
referring to a woman nearby. According to Langton, the speaker (S) may have intended
the utterance merely as advice while the hearer (H ) actually takes it as an order. She
argues, further, that since illocutionary force ought to be partly dened in terms of
conversational uptake, the act of uttering (12) in this context may objectively have
the illocutionary force of ordering, rather than advising, regardless of S’s intention.
This goes against the basic premise of intentionalism, according to which H would
simply have misunderstood S’s actual intention in taking the utterance as an order, if
it was really (intended as) mere advice. And so, on this view, the speech act had the
illocutionary force of giving advice.
The point here is not to argue against Langton’s description but, rather, to show
how the distinction between A-attitudes and B-attitudes aords us with a dierent
perspective on a case like this one. Suppose, for instance, that in some sense S is
aware or ought to be aware that the utterance might be understood as an order in the
context. S knows, say, that H is somewhat deferential and complaisant to others. Still,
S could convince themself, even just momentarily, that uttering (12) in this context is
merely giving advice, not issuing a command. So, it seems, S B-intends the utterance
of (12) as advice but A-intends it as an order. If this is possible, Langton’s description is
partly vindicated, even on minimally intentionalist grounds. That is to say, the speech
act was really an act of ordering, even if the speaker consciously thought what they
were doing was giving a piece of advice. But, on these assumptions, S couldn’t have
A-intended (12) as mere advice because S A-believes that (12) is more likely to be
taken as an order.
Developing this point in the detail it deserves will have to wait for a dierent
occasion. We have, however, established so far that assumptions A1 and A2 of so-
called Cartesian transparency are not nearly as safe as intentionalists tend to believe.
A1. Speakers have transparent, privileged access to what they consciously
intend, mean, and believe in uttering something.
A2. What speakers consciously intend, mean, and believe in uttering some-
thing is identical to what they really intend, mean, and believe in uttering
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something.
First, it is doubtful that speakers have transparent access to conscious intentions (A1)
but, even if this is conceded, it is considerably more doubtful that speakers’ conscious
intentions are constitutive of their actual intentions. We tell ourselves all sorts of
things, and appear to act for all sorts of fabricated reasons, without thereby having
transparent knowledge of the contents of our actual propositional attitudes.
Where does this leave us? Well, intention-based semantics, as far as I can see, still
stands as a metaphysical theory of what grounds or determines the proposition(s)
expressed by a speaker in making an utterance on a given occasion. This will be
the speaker’s communicative intentions, however exactly those are spelled out in the
nal theory. Still, since transparency is a doubtful epistemological thesis, the meaning-
intention problem becomes less of a sweeping tool for eliminating implicit reference
than it appeared to be. Surely, the fact that speakers believe that they implicitly refer
to locations in saying things like ‘It’s raining’, still constitutes some evidence that
this is indeed part of their communicative intention. And, conversely, their apparent
lack of awareness of intending to refer implicitly to epistemic standards or modes of
presentation gives some reason to think that they don’t. This is simply because people
do know something about what they mean, intend, and believe. But they also know
something, and in a similar way, about what others mean, intend, and believe. And it is
quite possible that some parts of speakers’ intended meaning are less noticeable from
a rst-person perspective, while being more so from a third-person point of view.
Stephen Schier (1992) is clearly concerned with arguing against philosophers’
over-intellectualization of normal speakers of natural language. He argues that since
the nonphilosopher would not even have access to the form of a specication of the
property of modes of presentation postulated by a given theory of belief ascription,
it beggars belief to suppose that such a person could intend to refer to the property
(1992: 513). On this view, we are barred from positing parts into conscious proposi-
tional attitudes of which the subject cannot possibly conceive. I rehearse this here to
make three related points. First, this is only credible as an account of our access to
conscious attitudes. As we have seen, these may only be tenuously related to other
mental attitudes. Secondly, intentionalism is in danger of succumbing to another kind
of intellectualism, namely, the intellectualism inherent in assumptions of transparency.
The apparent fact that people have fairly reliable knowledge of the contents of their
mental states is not sucient to show that there is no gap between the content and
the knowledge of that content. Otherwise, our similarly reliable perceptual capacities
should point in the same direction, but everyone allows that there is illusion and hal-
lucination in that case (Carruthers 2011: 34). Thirdly, intentionlists who accept mental
transparency run the risk of trivializing propositional attitude ascription generally.
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That is to say, if a propositional attitude is composed of two items p and q—one being,
e.g., what is said and the other what is implicated—and subjects are generally worse
at consciously detecting q-type contents than p-type contents, attitude attributions
by theorists will be systematically impoverished. Arguably, some people are worse
than others in consciously detecting some types of propositional attitudes; especially
gurative meanings, emotional attitudes, and conversational implicatures. Take g-
urative meaning interpretation, for example. The ability to interpret and understand
metaphorical and ironical utterances can be severely restricted by low IQ, various
brain damages and disorders, schizophrenia, and autistic spectrum disorder (Gibbs &
Colston 2012: 286-296).
Further, at least if Carruthers (2011, Ch. 10) is right, the empirical evidence suggests
that there is no dissociation between other-directed and self-directed mindreading
abilities; that is, whenever subjects are cognitively restricted in their capacity to rec-
ognize mental states in others they are also restricted in their capacity to recognize
those mental states in themselves. Supposing, then, that there is some property F of
propositional attitudes such that normal subjects are not very good at nding out
about F, transparency-theorists will tend to believe that F is never really a property
of propositional attitudes. But there is good reason, especially given the distinction
between A-attitudes and B-attitudes, to think there might very well be F-properties.
So, transparency amounts to trivializing the contents of mental states by systemati-
cally disallowing any F-type property. Now, I have by no means shown that implicit
reference to epistemic standards or to modes of presentation must be F-properties
of propositional attitudes. But the argument against that possibility was only, as I
understood it, that there couldn’t be F-properties or, at least, there couldn’t be very
complicated and unintuitive F-properties which ordinary speakers couldn’t possibly
conceive of. It follows from the above, however, that epistemic standards and modes
of presentation might very well be implicit parts of propositional attitudes, however
complex. So, in that respect, they are in the same boat as PRO, location-variables, and
the like.
5 Conclusion
I conclude that being a Mad Catter isn’t all that bad. Mad Catters believe that it is
possible to utter an expression with no phonological properties. They may also believe
that only utterances of words—not the word-types—have meanings that compose into
utterance meanings for the wholes of which they are proper parts. I have argued
elsewhere that this is very doubtful (Unnsteinsson 2014), but it is not doubtful because,
as Neale claims, there couldn’t be such a thing as an utterance of an aphonic. I also
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conclude that speakers’ lack of conscious awareness that they are using aphonics,
and their lack of conscious awareness that they intend to say and/or mean that p by
uttering something on a given occasion, does not imply that they don’t use aphonics
or that they don’t, on that occasion, say and/or mean that p.
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